Turkey's response to the global economic crisis by Turhan, Ibrahim M. & Kilinc, Zubeyir
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Turkey’s response to the global economic
crisis
Ibrahim M. Turhan and Zubeyir Kilinc
The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31214/
MPRA Paper No. 31214, posted 6. February 2012 16:43 UTC
37
T urkey is among the few countries that were not affected from the recent financial crisis as much as 
the advanced economies. Moreover, it has 
become one of the countries that got out of the 
economic downturn first. The reasons behind 
this strong response and quick recovery can be 
placed under two categories: low country risk 
premium and low currency risk. The indebted-
ness of both private and public sectors were low 
compared to its peer countries and the foreign 
exchange positions of these sectors were 
very strong. Several different measures of the 
economy can be considered while comparing 
the Turkish economy with its peers and show 
the Turkish economy’s pre-crisis situation and 
its resilience to the financial downturn. These 
measures are leverage on households and the 
corporate sector, the public sector’s debt level, 
and foreign exchange positions of individuals, 
the public and the corporate sectors. However, 
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in each measure the number of countries is limited by reliability and availability 
of the data.
Unlike its peers, the leverage ratios in Turkey for both private and public sec-
tors, stayed at moderate levels during the period of excess global liquidity. For the 
private sector, households’ indebtedness was kept below certain limits. Figure 1 
The figure plots the ratio of household liabilities to gross domestic product for Tur-
key, Eastern European countries and EU27. The ratio for Turkey is 9.7 percent and 
it is much lower than all of Eastern European countries and the EU27. The data is 
gathered from the European Central Bank and the Central Bank of Turkey.
Figure 1: The ratio of household liabilities to GDP (2000-2009, percent)
Table 1: The ratio of consumer loans to GDP (2000-2009, percent)
The table collects the ratio of consumer loans to GDP. The source of the data is Datastream. As mentioned in the 
text, this is a very difficult data set to collect. Therefore, different ways of calculations are applied while building 
this table. The differences in the calculations of the consumer loans are available upon request.
Turkey’s Response to the Global Economic Crisis
39
compares the ratio of household liabilities to gross domestic product (GDP) in 
Turkey and in the European Union and some of the Eastern European countries. 
Before the crisis, this ratio was very low in Turkey relative to the other countries. 
During the crisis, although this ratio had a tendency to increase among the East-
ern European countries, it did not change in Turkey. Table 1 collects a larger set of 
countries and compares the ratios of consumer loans to GDP. Although the cal-
culation techniques vary across countries, these numbers reflect the basic trends. 
The consumer loan to GDP ratio was the lowest in Turkey each year (except India 
and Indonesia for only a couple of years).
Figure 2: The ratio of consumer loans to GDP (2002-2009, percent)
The figure shows the ratio of consumer loans to Turkey’s gross domestic product com-
pared to the average of certain peer countries, including: Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colom-
bia, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, and South 
Africa. The data is collected from Datastream.
The figure 2 illustrates Turkey’s ratio of consumer loan to GDP and averages it 
out on a yearly basis in comparison to other countries during the pre-crisis period 
from 2000 to 2009. It is clear that Turkish consumers during the crisis only had a 
very low level of loans compared to the other countries. 
Although it is very difficult to find reliable data for corporate loans, the best 
approximations of the ratios of loans to corporate sector to GDP are collected and 
illustrated in figure 3. The figure shows that the liabilities of the corporate sector 
in Turkey remained relatively low. One of the reasons behind the low levels of 
indebtedness of households and corporate sector was that banks were subject to 
additional capital adequacy requirements and hence not allowed to increase their 
leverage to toxic levels.
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After 2006, a tendency of increasing household indebtedness and corporate 
sector debt was observed in almost all countries. However, in Turkey since the 
monetary policy was not accommodative, neither excessive lending nor asset 
bubbles were observed.
In Turkey, the public sector’s debt level has been significantly reduced since 
2002. This was a result of the Turkish government’s ambitious fiscal discipline. 
This discipline produced a primary surplus of five percent of GDP on average over 
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Figure 3: The ratio of corporate loans to GDP (2000-2009, percent)
* The data is taken from the Central Bank of the designated country. ** The data is compiled from the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey, Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency and the Turkish Statistical Institute. The figure shows the 
ratio of corporate loans to Turkey’s gross domestic product and its peer countries. This is a very difficult data to measure. 
To be able to consistent we tried to collect all the data from one source; however, none of the major data sources have the 
data for a large set of countries. Therefore, we used the ratio of the credits from banks to non-financial sector to the GDP. 
The data for credits to the non-financial sector is taken from Datastream and the GDP is taken from IMF World Economic 
Outlook database. For some of the countries the data is gathered from their central banks.
Figure 4: Public debt to GDP ratio (2004-2009, percent)
The figure draws the public debt to Turkey’s GDP ratios and certain of its peer countries. The data is taken from IMF World 
Economic Outlook, October 2010.
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the five year period prior to 2008. As shown in figure 4, Turkey’s public debt was 
already low prior to the crisis and its fiscal discipline was maintained during the 
turmoil. It is still below the Maastricht criteria, which states that the public debt to 
GDP ratio cannot exceed sixty percent. 
Along with the strong position of the Turkish economy led by the measures 
above, the real strength of the economy came from the management of its foreign 
exchange risks. Turkey’s foreign exchange position can be viewed as the most crit-
ical aspect of a small open economy. The overall position of the Turkish banking 
sector was balanced before the crisis.
As shown in figure 5, before the crisis, the Turkish banking sector’s net foreign 
exchange position is barely negative. Therefore, the Turkish banks were not fragile 
against a possible currency crisis. Moreover, since foreign currency denominat-
ed loans to individuals were prohibited and foreign currency deposits were not, 
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Figure 5: Net foreign exchange position of the Turkish banking sector
(2005:1-2010:3, million dollars)
The figure shows the net foreign exchange position of the private banking sector of 
Turkey. It shows that the Turkish banking sector was carrying a low currency risk 
during the pre-crisis period. The source of the data is the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency of Turkey.
households carried a significantly long position as a fallback (See figure 6). It was 
the corporate sector that carried a significant foreign exchange position, about 
10 percent of GDP (See figure 7). However, since the duration of their assets was 
short, whereas the duration of liabilities was long, the short term position of the 
Turkish firms was almost balanced. The short term foreign exchange position of 
the corporate sector is depicted in figure 8.
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All of these measures of the domestic economy are summarized by the two 
indicators to evaluate the country’s overall performance and risk. These indicators 
are the credit default swap index (CDS) and the emerging markets bond index 
(EMBI). Figure 91 plots the daily CDS of the countries. According to that figure, 
Turkey’s risk premium sustained a stable course, which is a result of its solid finan-
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Figure 6: The ratio of household foreign exchange deposits to Turkey’s GDP 
(2005-2009, percent)
The figure shows the ratio of foreign exchange deposits to GDP of Turkish households. It 
shows that the Turkish households were not very fragile against a currency crisis during 
the pre-crisis period. The data is compiled from two sources: the Central Bank of Turkey 
and the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency of Turkey.
The figure shows the foreign exchange position of the non-financial sector in Turkey. The data is taken 
from the Central Bank of Turkey.
Figure 7: Foreign exchange position of non-financial sector
(2005:1-2010:1, billion dollars)
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cial system and low levels of indebtedness, although the country has lower credit 
ratings. As the concerns regarding fiscal sustainability in the Euro Area continues, 
CDS premium of Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania stay higher than other Central 
and Eastern European countries. The EMBI-Global is presented in figure 102 and 
it shows that Turkey’s risk premium remains lower compared to the other emerg-
ing economies. Risk indicators of Turkey follow a parallel path with the Latin 
American countries, except Argentina.
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The figure shows the short-term foreign exchange position of Turkey’s non-financial sec-
tor. The data is collected from the Central Bank of Turkey.
Figure 8: Short term foreign exchange position of Turkey’s 
non-financial sector (2008:1-2010:2, billion dollars)
The figure plots the CDS of Turkey and its peer countries, except India since the Indian CDS is 
not rated. According to the figure, Turkey’s risk perception and CDS rate have been performing 
relatively better than the three Mediterranean euro members due to superior fiscal indicators. 
The data is collected from Bloomberg.
Figure 9: The credit default swap index (bps)
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Low leverage and low currency exposure became a major source of strength that 
contributed to the resilience of the Turkish economy to the global crisis. Here, we 
should mention a few policy decisions, which were made and will be applied by the 
Central Bank of Turkey and the Turkish government. The financial environment 
is still challenging and this situation is likely to persist in the foreseeable future. 
Therefore, the Central Bank continues to focus on financial stability and shapes 
its policies based on three principles. The first one is to discourage excessive lever-
age and to keep the banks and corporate sector’s debt ratios at modest levels. To 
that end it raised the required reserve ratios in Turkish lira liabilities and stopped 
remuneration of required reserves. It also enacted a technical adjustment in the 
policy rates to encourage better liquidity management within the banking system 
and to reduce the dependence of banks on the Central Bank’s lending facilities.
The second issue is strengthening the foreign exchange position of both the 
public and private sector. The Central Bank made a significant change in the 
method of foreign exchange buying auctions in late 2010 and accelerated the pace 
of reserve accumulation. 
It now applies a higher required reserve ratio for foreign exchange liabilities 
and has increased that ratio recently. The Regulatory and Supervisory Agency 
and the Central Bank also apply various rules and mechanisms to keep foreign 
44
The figure draws the EMBI-Global index for Turkey and its peer countries. There are two EMBI data sets. One of them is 
presented here and the other is designated as EMBI+. The main difference between these two indices is the criteria in the 
country selection. The reason of our choice is the number of countries included. The former index includes more countries 
than the latter. The data is taken from JP Morgan.
Figure 10: The emerging market bond index (bps)
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exchange position of the banks in check and prohibit the use of foreign exchange-
denominated or -indexed loans by households.
Finally, the government seems to be very determined in keeping fiscal dis-
cipline as tight as necessary while not being excessive. It announces a Medium 
Term Program regularly every year that covers the projected economic and fiscal 
outlook for the next three years. According to the most recent program, Turkey’s 
budget deficit will fall below the Maastricht criteria (3 percent) next year and pub-
lic debt ratio will decline more than 6 percentage points to 37 percent in 2013, 
lower than the pre-crisis level.
Endnotes
1. Although the figure cannot be read perfectly, the thickest line belongs to Turkey and it con-
veys the main message. All data is available upon request.
2. See the previous footnote.
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